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COMMENTS
CONCEALED CARRY: CAN HELLER'S HANDGUN
LEAVE THE HOME?
I. INTRODUCTION
"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed."'
On February 13, 2014, the Ninth Circuit ruled that San Diego
County's interpretation of the "good cause" requirement for a
concealed weapon license "impermissibly infringes on the Second
Amendment right to bear arms in lawful self-defense."2
Second Amendment jurisprudence is widely considered to be in
its infancy.3 It was only in 2008 that the United States Supreme
Court, in District of Columbia v. Heller, decided for the first time that
the Second Amendment affords an individual right to bear arms not
limited to militia purposes.4 The Court held that individuals have a
constitutional right to carry a handgun in their homes for the purpose
of self-defense.s Two years after Heller, in McDonald v. Chicago,6
the Court applied Heller's newly-defined individual right to the states
via selective incorporation.' However, the Supreme Court has not
1. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
2. Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1179 (9th Cir. 2014).
3. Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 789 (9th Cir. 2011).
4. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
5. Id.
6. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
7. Id. at 767-80. The Bill of Rights originally applied only to the federal
government. Id. at 754. Selective incorporation applies a constitutional right
equally to state and local governments by way of the liberty interest in the
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further clarified Heller or articulated the proper framework, in the
form of means-end scrutiny or some other standard of review, lower
courts should apply in Second Amendment cases.8 Thus, the impact
of Heller beyond the boundaries of the home remains unsettled. This
comment proposes a post-Heller analytical framework for courts to
apply in Second Amendment cases. Moreover, this comment uses the
recent challenge to San Diego County's interpretation of the "good
cause" requirement for a concealed weapons permit (CCW)9 as a
vehicle to demonstrate the application of that proposed framework.
The debate over the place of guns in our society is ongoing. In
light of recent decisions, it appears the debate will continue. 10
Specifically, after Heller, the issues lower courts must address are (1)
the scope of the right to keep and bear arms, and (2) acceptable
limitations on that right. The answer must lie between the States'
inherent police powers" and the Second Amendment, which confers
an individual right to keep and bear arms. 12
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. The incorporation analysis asks
whether the activity is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," a phrase coined
by Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut. 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). To be incorporated, a right must be
fundamental, defined as "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."
McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010).
8. Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2014).
9. Many jurisdictions require a CCW license or permit for individuals to carry
a loaded, concealed weapon. Requirements vary widely by state and county.
Although the term CCW is broader than its acronym suggests and includes general
licensing or permitting to carry a concealed weapon, usually, the "weapon" is a
revolver or semiautomatic handgun. See generally Attorney General: Frequently
Asked Questions, STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL, https://oag.ca.gov/firearms/pubfaqs (last visited March 22,
2014) (explaining CCW and basic firearms laws).
10. Compare Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3rd Cir. 2013), Woollard v.
Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013), and Kachalsky v. Westchester, 701 F.3d 81
(2nd Cir. 2012) with District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and
Peruta, 742 F.3d 1144.
11. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. This reserved right is the State's police power to
pass laws promoting the general welfare of its people. 16 AM. JUR. 2D
Constitutional Law § 346 (1969).
12. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595.
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The efficacy of gun control is similarly unsettled, in terms of both
the empirical data and public opinion.' 3  Gun violence-especially
handgun violence-is a serious problem in today's society. However,
the Heller Court acknowledged the Constitution "takes certain policy
choices off the table."l 4  Furthermore, determining prudent gun
control policy is unnecessary and generally irrelevant to how the
courts should approach their analyses.' 5  Put simply, Second
Amendment jurisprudence is-by definition-a legal issue. The
judiciary is required to conduct a legal analysis of the Second
Amendment, and not a public policy debate of the good and evil of
firearms. State and local legislatures, on behalf of their constituents,
rightly evaluate gun control policy considerations,' 6 while the
judiciary rightly evaluates the constitutionality of legislation. "
Accordingly, this comment is limited to a discussion of current
Second Amendment law.
II. HELLER HITS THE ROAD: PERUTA V. COUNTY OF SANDIEGO
Edward Peruta, a resident of San Diego, California, applied for a
license to carry a concealed handgun.' 8 To obtain a CCW in
13. Compare About Gun Violence, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN
VIOLENCE, http://www.bradycampaign.org/about-gun-violence (last visited March
22, 2014) (finding generally that fewer guns and more gun laws reduce instances of
gun violence), with JOHN Lorr, MORE GUNs LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME
AND GUN CONTROL LAWS (Univ. of Chi. Press, 1st ed., 1998) (finding that "shall
issue" CCW states have lower rates of violent crime).
14. Heller, 554 U.S. at 636.
15. Judge Easterbrook articulated this position during oral argument in a
Seventh Circuit case about a City of Chicago handgun ordinance. He asked counsel,
"You think the outcome of this case turns on whether John Lott is right in more
guns, less crime?" Then, answering his own rhetorical question, responded, "I can't
imagine that as a subject of constitutional adjudication." Transcript of Oral
Argument, NRA v. Chicago, 646 F.3d 992 (7th Cir. 2011) (No. 08-4241), 2009 WL
155653 1(referring to LOTT, supra note 13).
16. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(noting that a sovereign state is a "laboratory [of federalism]" where it can conduct
"social and economic experiments") (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
17. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
18. Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2014).
2014] 113
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California, an individual must apply in the city or county in which he
or she resides and show, among other things, that "[g]ood cause exists
for issuance of the license."' 9 San Diego County's CCW policy
defined "good cause" as "a set of circumstances that distinguish the
applicant from the mainstream and causes him or her to be placed in
harm's way." 20  San Diego County required applicants "to
demonstrate and elaborate good cause," and did not recognize concern
for personal safety alone as "good cause."21
Peruta claimed self-defense and personal protection as his
required "good cause" justification on his CCW application. 22 He
believed he and his wife were at risk of violent criminal attacks due to
the nature of his work, which required him to travel to remote and
sometimes high-crime areas, and because he carried large sums of
cash and valuables.23 The County denied his application,24 based on a
lack of supporting documentation.25
Following the denial, Peruta filed a complaint in the District Court
for the Southern District of California alleging Second and Fourteenth
Amendment violations. 26 Specifically, Peruta claimed the County's
denial infringed on his right to bear arms, travel, equal protection,2 7
and due process. 28
The court granted the County's motion for summary judgment,
holding that the "good cause" policy was constitutional under
19. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 26150(a)(2), 26155(a)(2).
20. Peruta, 742 F.3d 1148.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. First Amended Complaint 8-11, Peruta v. County of San Diego, 758 F.
Supp. 2d 1106 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09cv2371), 2011 WL 10663415 [hereinafter
Peruta FAC].
24. Although the County contested Peruta's claim of residency in San Diego
County, it based the denial on a lack of documented "good cause." The County did
not cite moral character and training requirements as factors in the denial.
Appellee's Brief at 7, Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014)
(No. 10-56971), 2011 WL 3689122, at *7 [hereinafter San Diego Brief].
25. Peruta FAC, supra note 23, 16.
26. Id. T 90-99.
27. Peruta alleged that the County's "good cause" and residency policies "are
an abuse of discretion, subjective, inherently prone to abuse, and results in the
unequal treatment of similarly situated individuals applying for a CCW." Id. 93.
28. Id. T 111-26, 139-41.
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intermediate scrutiny, thereby disposing of all claims. 29  Peruta
subsequently filed an appeal in the Ninth Circuit. On appeal, the court
addressed two threshold issues that could have defeated Peruta's
challenge at an early procedural phase. 30 First, what is the reach of
Heller? Second, what right does Peruta assert?
First, the parties disagreed as to the breadth of Heller. The
County argued the case stands for no more than possession of a loaded
handgun in the home, noting that Heller explicitly recognized the
"right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of
hearth and home."3 1 Adopting such a narrow interpretation of the
Court's ruling would be fatal to Peruta's challenge and indeed to
almost any CCW challenge. 32 In contrast, Peruta argued Heller-or a
logical extension of it-establishes the right to carry weapons in case
of confrontation. 33  Further, Peruta argued that though Heller
recognized the need for self-defense is most "acute" in the home, the
right does not end at the home's threshold.34 Embracing Peruta's
broader view would enable Peruta and similar public CCW cases to
remain viable constitutional challenges to handgun restrictions.
The second inquiry went to the purported right being invoked.
The County framed Peruta's challenge as asserting a right to "bear a
loaded, concealed firearm in public places."35 Adopting the County's
classification of the asserted right would insulate the County's
29. Peruta v. County of San Diego, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1117 (S.D. Cal.
2010).
30. In denying the County's earlier motion to dismiss, the district court found
that Peruta did have a valid Second Amendment claim. If the district court had
found that Peruta's claim was not within the scope of the Second Amendment, it
would have dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
31. San Diego Brief, supra note 24, at 9.
32. Interpreting the individual right recognized in Heller as limited to the
home would not place constitutional restrictions on CCW laws or interpretations of
those laws. CCW, by definition, is a "beyond the home" issue.
33. Appellants' Opening Brief at 11, Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d
1144 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 10-56971), 2011 WL 2130660, at *22 [hereinafter Peruta
Brief|.
34. Id. at *10.
35. San Diego Brief, supra note 24, at *9.
2014] 115
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discretionary policy.36 In contrast, Peruta asserted a right to armed
self-defense with a handgun, in the manner desired by the
legislature. 3 7 In California, the approved manner is concealed carry
with the proper license. 38  Case law, even post-Heller,
overwhelmingly supports the proposition that the concealed carrying
of weapons is subject to restriction and outright bans. 39 However,
whether Heller protected Peruta's more modest classification was still
undecided.
Adopting Peruta's arguments on these two threshold issues would
mean he was asserting a protected Second Amendment right.
Agreeing with Peruta, the Ninth Circuit found that Peruta was
asserting a right to bear arms within the meaning of the Second
Amendment. 4 0 The court then turned to the next question-whether
the County's interpretation of the "good cause" requirement infringed
on that right. This analysis necessarily begins with Heller, as it was
the first and only case to expressly recognize the individual Second
Amendment right.4'
III. THE HELLER REGIME
Heller remains the only substantive authority on the newly
clarified individual Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.
McDonald merely applied Heller to the states via selective
incorporation. Thus, lower courts reviewing Second Amendment
issues of first impression, such as CCW regulation, should adhere to
the Supreme Court's reasoning from Heller, because it most
36. There is no constitutional or common law basis conveying a blanket right
to carry loaded, concealed weapons in all public places. See District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). Further, Heller reiterated similar "longstanding
prohibitions" on firearms were not being overturned. Id.
37. See Peruta Brief, supra note 33, at *9.
38. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 25655 (West 2012).
39. See, e.g., People v. Flores, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 804, 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009);
People v. Yarbrough, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 674, 681-82 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). These
cases were decided after Heller but before California banned open carry.
40. Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014).
41. While McDonald is somewhat instructive, it primarily incorporates Heller,
adding little as far as analytical framework to apply in Second Amendment cases.
McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
116 [Vol. 51
7
Gonnella: Concealed Carry:  Can Heller's Handgun Leave the Home?
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2014
CAN HELLER'S HANDGUN LEAVE THE HOME?
accurately predicts how the Supreme Court will review any novel
Second Amendment case.42
Before Heller, the District of Columbia's statutory scheme
generally banned people from possessing handguns in public places
and in the home; 43  it did not allow people to carry unregistered
firearms and handguns could not be registered.44 A separate law
required a license to carry a handgun, the issuance of which was
governed by a discretionary "may-issue" process for one year
periods. 45 Additionally, the law required that firearms be "unloaded
and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device," unless
the firearm was in a place of business or being used in a lawful
recreational activity.46 Read together, the District of Columbia's
statutory scheme effectively prohibited carrying handguns.47 Notably,
the District of Columbia did not provide an exception for possession
or use in the home, even for self defense. 48
District of Columbia resident and special police officer Dick
Heller, was denied a license to keep a handgun in his home, despite
being authorized to carry a handgun as an armed guard of a judiciary
building. 49 Based on that denial, Heller filed a lawsuit in the district
42. To echo Justice Scalia's warning before announcing the Court's opinion,
"this summary . .. will state little more than the conclusions . .. to check its validity
[against the dissents' contrary claims,] you will have to read some 154 pages of
opinions." Opinion Announcement at 2:12, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570 (2008), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_290.
43. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 574 (2008).
44. Id. at 574-75.
45. Id. at 575.
46. Id. "Lawfully owned" firearms included registered long guns such as
rifles and shotguns. Id.
47. Id. at 574-76.
48. Using a handgun for self-defense in the home would necessarily violate
each of the three handgun provisions discussed: carrying the unregistered
handgun-because they cannot be registered; having the handgun assembled or
unlocked-because the gun must be loaded and operational to fire; and likely the
licensing provision-unless the Chief of Police grants permission. Id. at 574-75.
The fact that legitimate self-defense situations would likely not be prosecuted or
would be given a favorable judicial construction does not excuse an unconstitutional
law. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 401 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
49. Heller, 554 U.S. 575. The basis for the denial is not mentioned in the
complaint, 2003 WL 42057551, or in the Court's opinion.
2014] 117
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court challenging all three handgun restrictions on Second
Amendment grounds.5 0  The district court granted the District of
Columbia's motion to dismiss.5 ' Heller appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which reversed, and the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.52
A. The Supreme Court's Heller Analysis
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court held that the Second
Amendment confers an individual right to possess a firearm for the
purpose of self-defense within the home.5 3  The majority's
interpretation of the Second Amendment can be divided into three
general parts: (1) the text of the Second Amendment;5 4 (2) the
drafters' intent;55 and (3) the contemporaneous and subsequent
understanding of the right-the history.56
The text provides the greatest source of debate for Second
Amendment interpretation-particularly, the words "militia" and
"people." The text has two parts: the prefatory clause and the
operative clause. The prefatory clause, which states "[a] well-
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,"
seemingly contradicts the operative clause, which identifies who
possesses the right. The operative clause recognizes the right of the
"people," a term of art referring to a "class of persons who are part of
a national community.",5  Acknowledging this contradiction, the
Court adopted the presumption proffered by amici that the prefatory
clause explains the purpose of the Amendment but does not limit or
expand the scope of the right.
The Court then examined the phrase "to keep and bear arms" to
determine whether it was consistent with an individual right. First,
50. Id.
51. Id. at 576.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 589.
54. Id. at 577-600.
55. Id. at 600-05.
56. Id. at 605-09.
57. Id. at 579-80 (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,
265 (1990)).
58. Id. at 577, 580-81.
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Justice Scalia's review of non-legal founding era sources indicated
that the phrase was not limited to military contexts. 59  Likewise,
leading English jurist Sir William Blackstone's commentaries did not
support such an interpretation. 60 In addition, Justice Scalia cited a
recent Supreme Court opinion wherein Justice Ginsburg equated the
term "bear arms" with a non-militia meaning.' Specifically, Justice
Ginsburg recognized the term to include being "armed and ready for
offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another." 62
Next, the Court explained that the phrase "shall not be infringed,"
indicates that the Second Amendment "codified a pre-existing right,"
which provides additional textual support for the proposition that the
Second Amendment affords an individual right.63 The history of this
pre-existing right provides substantial guidance on the scope of the
individual right to bear arms as it was understood in the founding era,
and more specifically, in 1791.64 Modem Second Amendment
jurisprudence must rely on the historical understanding when applying
59. Id. at 581-92.
60. The Court relied heavily on Blackstone for its historical analysis of the
preexisting-it existed in England-right to bear arms. Id. at 594-99, 606-10, 626-
27.
61. Id. at 584 (citing Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998)).
That the expansive definition of "bear arms" in Muscarello came from Heller's
dissenting Justice Ginsburg is ironic, to say the least. The irony was not lost on
Justice Scalia, who concluded, "We think that Justice Ginsburg accurately captured
the natural meaning of 'bear arms."' Id. at 584.
62. Id. (citing Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 143). Such an expansive definition
supports the proposition that Heller does not stand for limiting the Second
Amendment to the home because this construction is only logical if conflict (and the
need for defensive action) were also limited to the home. The potential need for
self-defense is not so limited.
63. Id. at 592. The opinion also interpreted the terms "well-regulated Militia"
and "Security of a Free State." Id. at 597. "Well-regulated" was understood to
mean "proper discipline and training," and the Court rejected the narrow view of
"Militia" as government-regulated military forces. Id. at 595-97. "State," is used in
the broad sense of a "free polity," and does not refer to each of the several States.
Id. at 597-98.
64. Id. at 634-35 ("Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they
were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future
legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad.").
2014] 119
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the Second Amendment in contemporary cases challenging gun
laws. 65
The Court proceeded to discuss the historical understanding of the
Second Amendment, beginning in 17th Century England through the
ratification of the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights. 66 The
Court acknowledged the English Bill of Rights arms provisions as the
"predecessor" to the Second Amendment. 67 In 17th Century England,
the King's militia subdued political opponents of the Stuart Kings
through disarmament.68 In response, the subsequent English Bill of
Rights assured that Protestants would have the right to keep arms for
self-defense. 69 In light of this historical backdrop, early Americans
understood self-defense as necessary to "'repel force by force [when]
the intervention of society in his behalf, may be too late to prevent an
injury."' 70  The Court continued its discussion of the Second
Amendment's interpretation throughout American history from
ratification era commentary, 7 antebellum case law, 72 post-civil war
65. See id. at 576 ("The Constitution was written to be understood by the
voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as
distinguished from technical meaning"). Id. (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282
U.S. 716, 731). See also 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 62 (2014) ("When
interpreting a constitutional provision, a court examines its purpose and intent, and
by reviewing the history of the constitution and its amendments, the court endeavors
to place itself as nearly as possible in the situation of the parties at the time the
instrument was made, that it may gather their intention from the language used,
viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances." (quoting State v. Johanson (In
re State), 932 A.2d 848, 853 (N.H. 2007)).
66. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592-95, 598-605.
67. Id. at 593.
68. Id. at 592-93.
69. Id. The right applied only to Protestants but was given to them as
individuals, not as military members, which reinforces that self-defense was an
individual right. Id. at 593.
70. Id. at 595 (quoting 1 Blackstone's Commentaries 145-46 n.42 (1803).
71. Id. at 605-10.
72. Id. at 610-14 (reaffirming that the Second Amendment articulates a right
to self-defense, in contemplation of and in continuity with the preexisting English
right). "The right of the whole people ... and not militia only. . . shall not be
infringed .... [O]riginally belonging to our forefathers, trampled under foot by
Charles I and his two wicked sons and successors, re-established by the revolution
of 1688 . .. ." Id. at 613 (citing Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846)).
120 [Vol. 51
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legislation and commentary,73 and recent case law.7 ' Each period's
interpretation supported the Court's initial presumption that the
Second Amendment confers an individual right.
Finally, having determined that the Second Amendment confers
an individual right to bear arms for self-defense, the Court turned to
the challenged handgun laws.7 The question was whether the laws
impermissibly infringed upon that right. First, the Court reasoned that
"[t]he handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of
'arms' that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that
lawful purpose." 76 The Court emphasized that Americans particularly
prefer handguns for protection of the home and family. n
Recognizing that "[a] statute which, under the pretence of
regulating, amounts to a destruction of the right, or which requires
arms to be borne as to render them wholly useless for the purpose of
defence, [is] clearly unconstitutional," the Court proceeded to strike
down the registration and trigger lock requirements.78  The Court
noted that a ban on handguns in the home for self-defense would fail
"any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated
constitutional rights," because they amounted to a categorical ban on
the use of handguns for the lawful purpose of self-defense. 79
Ultimately, the Court ordered the District of Columbia to issue Heller
a license to carry his handgun in his home. 8
73. Id. at 614-19.
74. Id. at 619-25. The majority concluded that the Court's previous decision
in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), upholding certain gun laws did not
contradict its Heller decision.
75. Id. at 628.
76. Id. at 628. The opinion went on to discuss why handguns are the
"quintessential self-defense weapon," including the fact that they are lighter than
long guns (rifles or shotguns) and require little upper body strength to lift and aim.
Id. at 629.
77. Id. at 628-29. The word "family" indicates the individual right to bear
arms for self-defense is not limited to within the home. See Herbert Hovenkamp,
Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme Court's Lopez and
Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2213, 2235 (1996) (noting that
"ordinary rules of textual construction suggest that interpretations that produce
surplusage should be avoided").
78. Heller, 554 U.S. 629 (quoting State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616-17 (1840)).
79. Id. at 628-30.
80. Id. at 635.
2014] 121
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B. Full Choke: Lower Courts Struggle to Interpret Heller
Considering the undeveloped state of the Supreme Court's Second
Amendment jurisprudence, the lower courts must embrace their role to
"flush [sic] out the law and to decide upon cases as a matter of first
impression." 81As the Supreme Court anticipated, lower courts have
struggled to interpret Heller's identification of the "home" as a place
"where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most
acute." 82 As a result, many courts have interpreted Heller as limiting
the right to inside the home.8 3 However, a plain reading of the text
suggests circumstances exist where the need for self-defense is less
acute than in the home, yet still protected by the Second
Amendment. 84 While Heller does not confer a blanket right to carry a
gun for self-defense, Heller does not foreclose that possibility because
the issue remains open and undecided by the Supreme Court.8 The
lower courts must engage in essentially a "predictive exercise" on
matters of first impression. 86 The fact that a Supreme Court holding
does not cover certain conduct does not mean it is unprotected if the
issue has never been decided.8 Courts should adopt the Supreme
Court's analysis to review similar cases, and decide how it would
decide "the ultimate question."88 Similarly, courts should not assume
"open issues," such as CCW are unprotected Second Amendment
81. Transcript of Oral Argument (argued May 26, 2009), NRA v. Chicago,
646 F.3d 992 (7th Cir. 2011) (No. 08-4241), 2009 WL 1556531 [hereinafter Gura
Oral Argument].
82. The circuit conflict exemplifies this disagreement over whether "home"
operates as a limitation on Heller's holding. See infra Part VI.A.
83. See, e.g., Kachalsky v. Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2nd Cir. 2012); Drake v.
Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3rd Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir.
2013).
84. The Court's recognition of self-defense in the home as protected conduct
should not be understood to disallow self-defense outside of the home. The
Majority acknowledged it left these types of questions undecided. See District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634-35 (2008).
85. See generally Gura Oral Argument, supra note 81, at 1 (arguing that the
Supreme Court's reasoning should be adopted by the Court of Appeals to decide an
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conduct. Rather, lower courts should attempt to resolve these open
issues as they anticipate the Supreme Court would if it were hearing
the same case. 89
IV. PERUTA APPEALS
The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on Heller in analyzing Peruta's
challenge to San Diego County's CCW policy.90 First, as discussed
above, the court interpreted the breadth of Heller, to determine
whether lawfully carrying a weapon outside the home for individual
self-defense was a protected Second Amendment activity. After
finding it protected, the court had to decide if the County
impermissibly infringed upon Peruta's Second Amendment right
when it denied him a CCW pursuant to its "good cause" policy
requirement. To that end, a comprehensive understanding of
California gun laws is needed. This section will proceed with an
overview of California law, summarize the Ninth Circuit's Peruta
opinion, and examine the impact of that decision.
A. California CCWLaw
In California, it is generally unlawful to carry a concealable 9 1
firearm in public.92  Violations are punishable as misdemeanors. 93
89. Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting
"constitutional law is very largely a prediction of how the Supreme Court will
decide particular issues when presented to it for decision").
90. See infra Part IV.B.
91. A "concealable" firearm is one with a barrel less than 16 inches long.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 16530 (West 2012). As a practical matter, the definition
encompasses handguns-semiautomatics and revolvers. Short-barreled shotguns
and rifles may also be "concealable," but are already expressly prohibited. Id. §
33210.
92. Id. § 25400.
93. Id. § 25400(c)(5)-(7). Violations with enumerated aggravating
circumstances (e.g., involving a stolen firearm or gang activity) are punishable as
felonies. Id. § 25400(c)(l)-(4). The scope of this comment is limited to otherwise
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While there are a variety of narrow exceptions,94 the more traditional
"exception" is obtaining a license.
California is a "may-issue" state-an issuing agency has
discretion to grant or deny a CCW license. 95 Generally, the County
Sheriff processes applications; 96 however, processing may be
delegated to the police department of an incorporated city. 97 To be
granted a license, the applicant must be a resident or employed in the
county, complete a training course, have good moral character, and
demonstrate "good cause." 98 On appeal, Peruta did not challenge the
statutory requirement of "good cause;" rather he challenged the
County policy that rejected self-defense as satisfactory "good cause"
absent a documented threat. 99
The County defined "good cause" as "a set of circumstances that
distinguish the applicant from other members of the general public
and causes him or her to be placed in harm's way."100 Generalized
fear for one's personal safety was not, standing alone, considered
94. Retired policemen may carry a concealable weapon in public, CAL. PENAL
CODE § 25455 (West 2012), as may licensed hunters and fishermen while engaged
in the activity. CAL. PENAL CODE § 25640. This also includes "going to or
returning from" hunting or fishing. Id. There is no case on point, but, presumably
this means walking to and from the field (not driving to or from a fishing or hunting
location). Concealable weapons may also be carried to or from a target range. Id. §
25540. A "reasonable belief of grave danger" is another exception under section
25600, however, this exception does not excuse a violation immediately preceding
such danger. Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1147 n.1 (9th Cir.
2014) (noting that "where the fleeing victim would obtain a gun during that interval
is apparently left to Providence.").
95. PENAL § 26150. This discretion is implicit because there are no objective
standards of "good cause" and the issuing authority may issue.
96. Id.
97. See License & Registration Division, SAN DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF'S
DEPARTMENT, http://www.sdsheriff.net/licensing.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).
98. Id. Additionally, applicants must not otherwise be prohibited from owning
or possessing a firearm (e.g. have a felony conviction, be subject to a restraining
order, or be determined mentally ill). See Firearms Prohibiting Categories,
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF FIREARMS,
http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/pdfs/firearms/forms/prohibcatmisd.pdf (last visited
Feb. 22, 2014).
99. Peruta Brief, supra note 33, at *8.
100. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1148.
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"good cause.""o' The County required applicants citing personal
protection as their justification for CCW to show "documented threats,
restraining orders, and other related situations where an applicant can
demonstrate that he or she is a specific target presently at risk of
harm." 0 2  Peruta's application was denied for lack of sufficient
documentation of "good cause."l
0 3
B. The Ninth Circuit Weighs In
The Ninth Circuit issued the Peruta v. County of San Diego
opinion on February 13, 2014.104 The court first determined whether
a law-abiding citizen's ability to carry a gun outside the home for self-
defense fell within the scope of the Second Amendment. 0 5  To
answer this question, the court, much like the Supreme Court did in
Heller, looked to the text of the Second Amendment and "original
public understanding" to determine the scope of the right,106 by
examining: founding era treatises; 19th Century case law; and post-
Civil War legislation and legal commentary.107 Of these discussions,
the court's methodology regarding 19th Century cases appears to be
the most influential on its ultimate conclusion.' 0 8  Specifically, the
101. Id.
102. San Diego Brief, supra note 24, at *7.
103. Id.
104. Peruta, 742 F.3d 1144.
105. Id. at 1150.
106. Original public understanding was crucial to the court's determination of
the scope of the right:
Understanding the scope of the right is not just necessary, it is key to our
analysis. For if self-defense outside the home is part of the core right to
"bear arms" and the California regulatory scheme prohibits the exercise of
that right, no amount of interest-balancing under a heightened form of
means-end scrutiny can justify San Diego County's policy.
Id. at 1167. If a law-abiding citizen's ability to carry a gun outside the home for
self-defense is a core right, then the only way to implement a complete ban on that
activity is by constitutional amendment. See id. ("The very enumeration of the right
takes out of the hands of government--even the Third Branch of Government-the
power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting
upon.") (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008)).
107. Id. at 1150-67.
108. See id. at 1155-56.
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court organized cases into three distinct categories, in order of
importance: "(1) authorities that understand bearing arms for self-
defense to be an individual right, (2) authorities that understand
bearing arms for a purpose other than self-defense to be an individual
right, and (3) authorities that understand bearing arms not to be an
individual right at all." 109 In interpreting the original understanding of
the right to keep and bear arms, the court gave the most importance to
category one, which identifies the right consistent with the ruling in
Heller.110 Category two cases, which do not closely mirror Heller's
premise were given less weight."' Category three cases, were
expressly rejected by Heller, and given no weight.1 2  The court
concluded its comprehensive historical review by holding that the
phrase "bear arms" includes the right to carry an operable handgun
outside the home for the lawful purpose of self-defense. 113
Next, the court found that the San Diego County Sheriffs policy
burdened the Second Amendment right, and that the burden was
severe. 1 14 Similar to Heller's handgun ban inside the home, the court
found San Diego County's restrictions outside the home amounted to
a near prohibition."' In reaching this conclusion, the court considered
the policy in conjunction with California's ban on open carry, which
left no lawful manner of carry for self-defense.1 6 The Ninth Circuit
did not hold that may-issue policies are per se invalid.117 Rather an
open carry or a may-issue regime that recognizes self-defense as
"good cause" would satisfy the Second Amendment.118 Because the
court found a Heller-like "near-total prohibition on bearing arms," it
found the policy unconstitutional without applying any level of
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1156-57.
111. Id. at 1157-60.
112. Id. at 1160.
113. Id. at 1166.
114. Id. at 1168-70.
115. Id. at 1170.
116. Id. at 1172.
117. Id.
118. See id. ("To be clear, we are not holding that the Second Amendment
requires the states to permit concealed carry. But the Second Amendment does
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scrutiny. 119 However, the court implied that the policy would fail any
level of heightened scrutiny because it lacks narrow tailoring. 120
C. The Fallout: Practically and Procedurally
Technically, Peruta does not disturb California law on CCW. The
opinion makes clear that only the San Diego County Sheriff's
interpretation of good cause is unconstitutional.121 However, the
State of California's interest in intervention demonstrates that this
"technicality" has the practical effect of substantially invalidating
California's CCW law.' 22  Post-Peruta, all counties are required to
recognize general self-defense as good cause.123 The end result is
California's transformation from a "may-issue" to a "shall-issue"
state. 124
While the Ninth Circuit's Peruta decision is a major victory for
gun rights advocates, its finality is uncertain. The court has denied the
119. Id. at 1170, 1175.
120. See id. at 1175-78.
121. Id. at 1489.
122. Interview with Peruta's Counsel Paul Neuharth, The Law Office of Paul
Neuharth, Jr. APC, in San Diego, Cal. (Feb. 18, 2014).
123. Id.
124. CCW licensing in most states is either "shall-issue" or "may-issue". In
both systems, the applicant must pass standard, objective requirements such as a
background check, a "qualification shoot" for firearms proficiency and accuracy,
and a safety course. May-issue states have discretionary permit systems giving the
County Sheriff or local police department discretion to implement the state's
statutory CCW scheme, often in the form of a "good cause" or character
determination. This is in addition to the standard requirements. A shall-issue state
allows no such discretionary determination; if the applicant meets the standard
requirements, the issuing authority "shall issue" the permit. Jim Cleary & Emily
Shapiro, The Effects of "Shall-Issue" Concealed-Carry Licensing Laws: A
Literature Review, Information Brief, Minnesota House of Representatives,
Research Department (Feb. 1999), http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/
pubs/concarry.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). Accordingly, permits are easier to
obtain in shall-issue states. A small number of states do not allow CCW at all, while
others do not require any licensing, colloquially called "Constitutional Carry."
Douglas Little, Arizona Constitutional Carry and the "Law of Unintended
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State's motion to intervene,1 25 and San Diego County and Sheriff Bill
Gore have announced they will not seek a rehearing or further review,
and will comply with the Ninth Circuit ruling once it is finalized. 126
However, it remains to be seen if the State will seek Supreme Court
review of its intervention in an attempt to revisit the merits of this
case. 12 Regardless of the importance of Peruta to San Diegans and
the Ninth Circuit, a final disposition does not change the opinion's
continuing validity as a proposed standard when the CCW issue
ultimately reaches the Supreme Court.12 8
V. POSSIBLE JUDICIAL STANDARDS
Lower courts have implemented a variety of analytical approaches
to the open issue of the proper judicial standard for CCW laws. This
confusion stems not only from what Heller left open, but also in
deciphering its holding from dicta. Regardless, even the Court's dicta
in the "predictive exercise" 129 on matters of first impression may be
the most useful guidance in determining the proper standard. Because
the Supreme Court has not identified a standard for CCW cases, this
section will focus on the merits of the various proposed standards.
Aside from a sui generis Heller approach, these standards are
discussed, generally, from the strictest-a standard that is most
difficult for a law to withstand, to the most deferential-a standard
that is easiest for the government to satisfy. The discussion will not
discount possible theories and cases that may have little precedential
value or negative subsequent history.
125. Peruta v. County of San Diego, No. 10-56971, 2014 WL 5839792, (9th
Cir. Nov. 12, 2014).
126. News Release, Letter from Bill Gore, San Diego County Sheriff to the
County Board of Supervisors (Feb. 21, 2014)
http://apps.sdsheriff.net/press/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2014) (on file with
author).
127. The Peruta panel noted non-parties cannot seek rehearing en banc.
Peruta, 2014 WL 5839792, at *1. Presumably, the State would need the Supreme
Court to reverse on the intervention issue. Only then could it request rehearing, or
challenge another adverse decision on the merits by the en banc panel to the
Supreme Court.
128. Because the CCW question is an open issue, the Supreme Court may find
the opinion instructive regardless of its precedential value.
129. Gura Oral Argument, supra note 81.
128 [Vol. 51
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A. Prior Restraint
Under prior restraint, a law that "makes the peaceful enjoyment of
freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the
uncontrolled will of an official-as by requiring a permit or license
which may be granted or withheld in the discretion of such official" is
unconstitutional.130 Borrowing from First Amendment jurisprudence,
the plaintiff in Richards v. County of Yolo urged prior restraint as the
proper standard for determining the validity of California's
discretionary CCW law.' 3' The court declined to apply this
"traditional First Amendment analysis."l 32
This standard is an attractive option because it does not require
the court to apply a certain level of scrutiny. Thus, courts could strike
down overly burdensome gun laws while abstaining from the
establishment of an "interest-balancing" standard associated with
traditional levels of means-end scrutiny. This would be consistent
with the Heller majority's rejection of such an "interest-balancing
inquiry." 133
B. Strict Scrutiny
To withstand strict scrutiny, a law must be "narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling Government interest." 34 This highest standard
of "means end scrutiny"l3 has been described as "'strict' in theory
130. Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958). Plaintiff-Appellant's
Brief at *37, Richards v. Prieto, 560 Fed. Appx. 681 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 11-16255),
2011 WL 9535599.
131. 821 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1175-76 (E.D. Cal. 2011), rev'd sub nom.
Richards v. Prieto, 560 Fed. Appx. 681 (9th Cir. 2009).
132. Id. The plaintiff in Drake v. Filko made the same argument, which the
Third Circuit rejected. 724 F.3d 426, 435 (3rd Cir. 2013).
133. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008).
134. United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
135. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 606 (1995) (citing United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)). Carolene footnote four is
widely considered one of the most famous in the history of constitutional law. See,
e.g., Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene Products
Footnote, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 163 (2004); see also Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene
Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (1982) (calling footnote 4 "the
most celebrated footnote in constitutional law"). The highly influential dicta
1292014]
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and fatal in fact."' 3 6 Although the "fatal" effect of administering strict
scrutiny has been called into question,'13  it is undoubtedly an
extremely high burden for the government to meet.13 1 Thus, strict
scrutiny was favored by Peruta and disfavored by the County.139
Courts generally apply strict scrutiny to laws that interfere with
fundamental constitutional rights.'40  The Supreme Court in
McDonald decided that the Second Amendment does confer a
fundamental right.141 Thus, the argument for applying strict scrutiny
to a challenged CCW policy is strong.14 2  However, such a
determination depends on whether CCW for self-defense falls within
the scope of the Second Amendment right.
In Peruta the County advanced Justice Breyer's Heller dissent, 143
arguing that the majority's recognition of the continuing validity of
introduced the idea of multilevel means-end scrutiny, now central to modem
constitutional analysis whereby fundamental rights (including incorporated
constitutional amendments) and suspect class distinctions receive heightened
judicial scrutiny. Powell, supra at 1088. The Second Amendment is the most recent
to be incorporated, applying the landmark Heller decision to state and local
governments. See McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
136. Gerald Gunther, In search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
137. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical
Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REv. 793, (2006)
(using empirical data to suggest that the "strict scrutiny myth" overstates the
lethality of the standard); see also Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237
(1995) ("[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but
fatal in fact."').
138. This is because under strict scrutiny, the law loses its presumption of
validity. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973).
139. San Diego Brief, supra note 24, at 13; Peruta Brief, supra note 33, at 18-
19.
140. San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 16; but see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and
Strict in Fact: An Empiracal Analysis ofStrict Scrutiny in Federal Courts, 59 VAND.
L. REv. 793, 815 (2006) (arguing that not all fundamental rights trigger an equally
protective level of strict scrutiny).
141. McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778.
142. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
143. Justice Breyer noted that:
Respondent proposes that the Court adopt a "strict scrutiny" test, which
would require reviewing with care each gun law to determine whether it is
"narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest." But the
majority implicitly, and appropriately, rejects that suggestion by broadly
130 [Vol. 51
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longstanding prohibitions implicitly rejected strict scrutiny.144 The
County contended the court should not adopt a standard that would
invalidate these longstanding prohibitions,14 5 which the Heller
majority went so far as to characterize as "presumptively lawful." 46
Additionally, although not argued by the County in great depth,
presumptive constitutionality identifies with lower levels of scrutiny
rather than heightened scrutiny. 147
The County's argument, however, cannot preclude the application
of strict scrutiny to Second Amendment cases. The theory that the
Supreme Court implicitly rejected strict scrutiny cannot supplant the
fact it expressly stated otherwise.14 8  Moreover, the Court did not
reject strict scrutiny, it unambiguously declined to "clarify the entire
field" by endorsing any level of scrutiny at all.149
C. Nordyke Substantial Burden
In Nordyke v. King, the Ninth Circuit addressed a challenge to a
ban on gun shows at fairgrounds on county property.'5 0 Relying on
First Amendment and abortion cases, the Ninth Circuit applied a
substantial burden analysis to the Second Amendment challenge.' 5 '
As applied in Nordyke, the adapted substantial burden inquiry asked
whether the gun show restriction left "reasonable alternative means
approving a set of laws-prohibitions on concealed weapons, forfeiture by
criminals of the Second Amendment right, prohibitions on firearms in
certain locales, and governmental regulation of commercial firearm
sales-whose constitutionality under a strict scrutiny standard would be
far from clear.
Id. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
144. San Diego Brief, supra note 24, at *13.
145. See id.
146. Heller, 554 U.S. 626 n.26.
147. See San Diego Brief, supra note 24, at *19.
148. See Heller, 554 U.S. 634-35 (responding to criticism of leaving the
standard of review unanswered and deciding it will defer that decision to a future
case).
149. Id.
150. Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated, 681 F.3d 1041
(9th Cir. 2012).
151. Id. at 784-86.
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for obtaining firearms sufficient for self-defense purposes."l 52 The
court ultimately upheld the law after the State conceded, at oral
argument, that it would allow gun shows on the fairgrounds if sellers
"tethered" firearms to a large object (similar to cell phones in an
electronics store). 153
The Nordyke panel articulated a two-part test. First, whether the
law imposes a substantial burden on the exercise of the Second
Amendment right; if so, the court will apply heightened scrutiny. 154
The Court declined, however, to identify the appropriate level of
heightened scrutiny. 5s Second, if the law is a substantial burden, the
court will ask whether it constitutes an undue burden or if "reasonable
alternative means" to exercise the right are available.15 6  Undue
burden and "reasonable alternative means" are considered distinct
factors, but they operate as one; if a law leaves "reasonable alternative
means" to exercise the right, then the law cannot amount to an undue
burden. 157 Therefore, laws that amount to a substantial but not an
undue burden, are constitutional if they can withstand a heightened
level of scrutiny.
An important part of assessing the burden is identifying
alternative options for carrying a handgun. Prior to 2012, a
longstanding alternative to concealed carry in California was unloaded
open carry ("UOC"). 1 8  UOC was available when the Peruta
152. Id. at 787.
153. Id. at 786 n.9.
154. Id. at 786.
155. Id. at 786 n.9.
156. Id. Here, the court borrowed from First Amendment doctrines like time,
place, and manner restrictions on content neutral speech.
157. See id.
158. The open carrying or unconcealed carrying of a handgun was not a crime
in California until 2012, when Penal Code section 26350 became effective. See
Peruta v. County of San Diego, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1115-17 (S.D. Cal. 2010)
("nothing in [California Penal Code] section 12031 restricts the open carry of
unloaded firearms and ammunition ready for instant loading."). Unloaded open
carry was widely criticized by gun rights advocates and gun control advocates alike.
The enforcement of the unloaded provision wasted police resources, which required
an officer to verify a firearm is unloaded by inspecting the chamber and magazine.
See, e.g., ABC News Covers Open Carry in Livermore CA.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-fJVpCMyMKWU (last visited March, 22, 2014)
(showing law enforcement officers performing an "e-check" ensuring compliance
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complaint was filed. California law allowed the open carry-in a belt
holster or otherwise visible holster-of an unloaded handgun.' 59
California also permitted the carrying of a loaded magazine' 6 0  or
speedloaderl61 available for immediate loading. The parties' briefs
discussed, at length, the availability of UOC as a mitigating factor
giving citizens a viable alternative to carrying concealed and
loaded.162 By the time the Ninth Circuit decided Peruta, however,
UOC had been banned,163 undermining the State's position. Thus, an
alternative manner of carry no longer mitigated any Second
Amendment burden caused by the County's CCW policy. The
remaining issue became one of determining the proper standard of
review or means-end scrutiny to apply.1 64 The Nordyke substantial
burden test remains a viable standard for all may-issue states, but state
laws offering minimal alternatives for carry face a higher likelihood of
invalidation.
with the unloaded requirement pursuant to Penal Code section 12031(e)). The "e-
checks" are considered wasteful as a crime prevention consideration because UOC
was the preferred method of non-violent political activists, whereas, criminals
generally prefer to carry weapons loaded and concealed. It also had the potential to
escalate into hostile police encounters, frightening the public and harming the
perception of lawful gun owners. See, e.g., id.
159. California did not expressly recognize open carry; rather, it was
permissible by operation of the two relevant Penal Code sections. Section 12031
prohibited carrying loaded firearms, and section 25400 prohibited concealed
firearms. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12031 (West 2010) (repealed 2012); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 25400 (West 2012). As a result, unloaded and unconcealed firearms could
be lawfully carried.
160. See id. The pistol could then be loaded when the statutory exception for
reasonable belief of grave danger is met. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12031 (j)(1) (West
2010).
161. A speedloader is a device commonly associated with revolvers which
allows the simultaneous loading of multiple rounds of ammunition to fill the entire
cylinder at once. Because revolvers cannot accept detachable magazines like
semiautomatic handguns, speedloaders reduce loading time that would otherwise be
performed one round at a time.
162. San Diego Brief, supra note 24, at 11-12; Peruta Brief, supra note 33, at
14, 16-17.
163. Penal Code section 26350, which became effective January 1, 2012,
made the open carry of an unloaded firearm unlawful.
164. Appellants Citation of Supplemental Authority Rule 28(j) Letter re:
California Assembly Bill No. 144, Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144
(9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2014) (No. 10-56971).
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D. Intermediate Scrutiny
"To survive intermediate scrutiny, the challenged provision must
be substantially related to the achievement of important government
interests." 16 5 This standard appears to be the middle ground between
the parties' positions in Peruta. Indeed, the district court relied on this
standard when it decided on the issues presented.16 6 However, both
parties agreed it was not the appropriate standard to apply, and the
briefs addressed it only in the alternative.167
On appeal, the County contended that courts should not apply a
standard higher than intermediate scrutiny, acknowledging that post-
Heller courts have repeatedly applied intermediate rather than strict
scrutiny.'6 8 The County relied on various Second Amendment cases
that rejected strict scrutiny, for example: one involved a law making it
a crime for a felon to possess a firearm,' 69 and the other a law making
it a crime to knowingly possess a gun with an obliterated serial
number.170 In both cases, the defendants were charged with a crime
for conduct that occurred inside a home.' 7 ' The County argued that
the home deserves heightened constitutional protection, but that CCW
outside the home should not have an equivalent or higher standard.172
That analysis was flawed, however, because its reasoning applied
factual scenarios explicitly rejected in Heller as outside the scope of
the Second Amendment right. Specifically, the County's analysis
focused on laws targeted at felons and individuals obliterating serial
numbers, analogizing them to Peruta's asserted right to armed self-
165. San Diego Brief, supra note 24, at *14 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976)).
166. Peruta v. County of San Diego, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1115-17 (S.D. Cal.
2010).
167. San Diego Brief, supra note 24, at *14-*15; Peruta Brief, supra note 33,
at *44-*45.
168. San Diego Brief, supra note 24, at *15.
169. United States v. Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162 (W.D. Tenn. 2009).
170. United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d 596 (W.D. Pa. 2009).
171. The County seemingly broadens Heller's mandate as protecting "firearm
possession in the home." This selectively generous definition leads to perverse
results, whereby serial number obliteration (a presumptively unlawful purpose) in
the home would receive more Second Amendment protection than self-defense (a
presumptively lawful purpose) occurring outside the home.
172. San Diego Brief, supra note 24, at *15.
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defense. The cases cited by the County are the type of prohibition
contemplated by Heller as presumptively lawful. Heller clarified the
Court was not disturbing what was already clear: "[N]othing in our
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on
the possession of firearms by felons ... [or] carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools." 73  Peruta's case-and any case
worthy of review-should concern a law-abiding citizen's desire for
armed self-defense beyond the home, which is arguably within the
right as it was understood in 1791.
E. Rational Basis
The highly deferential rational basis review rarely impedes
implementation of "legislative policy judgments."l 74 Laws enacted
under a State's general police powers are presumptively constitutional
and will not be invalidated as long as the law is reasonably related to a
legitimate governmental interest. 175
Although the Supreme Court in Heller did not mandate a certain
level of scrutiny for Second Amendment cases, it did remove rational
basis review from consideration as too low a standard for an
enumerated constitutional right.176  Therefore, the recurring State
argument calling for rational basis review appears facially
incompatible with the mandate of Heller. Still, whether rational basis
review could be used depends on the threshold question of whether
the targeted activity is within the scope of the Second Amendment.
Therefore, the State does not argue that rational basis review is
appropriate for certain Second Amendment activities, but rather that
some conduct, such as public CCW, falls entirely outside the scope of
the Second Amendment right.
173. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). Similarly, it is
unlikely the Court's decision should "cast doubt" on presumptively lawful
prohibitions on the obliteration of serial numbers.
174. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 606 (1995).
175. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 347 (1969).
176. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 ("If all that was required to overcome the
right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be
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F. Reasonableness Review
A restriction will withstand reasonableness review if it "is a
reasonable exercise of the State's inherent police powers."' 7 7 Though
similar, it is distinct from rational basis review, and is considered an
appropriate standard where the "core right" in question remains
available to the people through reasonable means.1 78  Courts have
applied this standard in First Amendment cases, 179 where the court's
speech jurisprudence distinguishes between political and commercial
speech. Similarly, the Supreme Court recently distinguished self-
defense as a core Second Amendment right.180
As a policy matter, state and local legislatures, governments
closest to the people, are better equipped to make public safety
determinations than the judiciary.' 8  In Peruta, the County cited
Turner for the proposition that substantial deference should be given
to the legislature in exercising its police powers.' 8 2  While this
standard may be acceptable in some Second Amendment applications,
CCW cases invoke the "core right" of self-defense identified in
Heller. Therefore, like rational basis review, the Supreme Court
would likely consider reasonableness review an unacceptable standard
to CCW cases implicating self-defense.' 83
VI. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD APPLY A "TIERED-HELLER"
FRAMEWORK TO A CCW CASE
When the Supreme Court decides its next Second Amendment
case, and if it must determine a standard or level of scrutiny, it should
use what this comment proposes as the "Tiered-Heller" approach.
This standard would expressly adopt what was left unanswered, yet
implicit in Heller.
177. San Diego Brief, supra note 24, at 15.
178. Id.
179. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 399 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
180. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635-36. Whether this "core right" extends to
activities such as hunting and sporting applications is yet to be determined.
181. See San Diego Brief, supra note 24, at 16.
182. Id. (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997)).
183. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27.
136 [Vol. 51
27
Gonnella: Concealed Carry:  Can Heller's Handgun Leave the Home?
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2014
CAN HELLER'S HANDGUN LEAVE THE HOME?
In Heller, the Court applied a two-step approach familiar to
constitutional law. The first step determined whether the individual
right to bear arms for self defense was a protected Second
Amendment activity.1 84 Second, the Court weighed the effect of the
challenged gun laws on that activity to determine the extent of the
burden.' 8 5 Finding that the challenged gun laws amounted to a near-
complete ban, the Court struck down the laws because they
impermissibly infringed on Second Amendment rights. The Court did
not apply any level of means-end scrutiny.' 86
When a challenged law does not amount to a complete or near-
complete ban, the "Tiered-Heller" approach adds the next logical step
in determining the challenged law's validity. This third step requires
the Court to determine the severity of the burden and assign a
corresponding level of judicial scrutiny (tiers). More burdensome laws
will exact higher levels of scrutiny than those that only incidentally
affect Second Amendment rights.187
This "Tiered-Heller" would follow basic constitutional avoidance
principles,' 88 facilitate decisions on the narrowest grounds possible,' 89
184. Id. at 576-626.
185. Id. at 626-35.
186. This approach was substantially followed in Peruta. Peruta v. County of
San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1149, 1167 (9th Cir. 2014). This section does little more
than give it a name, "Tiered-Heller," and suggest the next step if protected Second
Amendment conduct is restricted but not completely prohibited.
187. The word burden here has no connection to the undue burden or
substantial burden principles of constitutional law. However, the term "level of
infringement" is an unacceptable term because it conflicts with the text of the
Second Amendment commanding "the right to keep and bear arms, shall not be
infringed." U.S. CONsT. amend. II (emphasis added). A natural reading provides
that the right shall not be infringed at all. This is not to say there can be no
restrictions or laws on firearms. Simply, laws that regulate guns and still pass
constitutional muster do not infringe on the right.
188. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) ("It is
not the habit of the court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless
absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.") (quoting Burton v. United States,
196 U.S. 283, 295 (1904)). With this approach, the Court could exercise judicial
restraint while still addressing laws that are most likely in violation of Heller.
189. A systematic tiered approach only requires the Court to proceed with its
analysis if the previous step is satisfied. In contrast, an "interest-balancing"
approach that weighs a comprehensive yet unidentified set of factors was
admonished by the Heller majority. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
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and provide clarity and redress for the most severe burdens on
protected Second Amendment conduct' 90
A. The Supreme Court Should Hear a Peruta-Like Case
Post-Peruta, the appellate circuits courts are split on the issue of
whether the Second Amendment protects a law-abiding citizen's
ability to bear arms outside the home for the lawful purpose of self-
defense.' 9' The "pro-gun" circuits are the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.
In Moore, the Seventh Circuit struck down an Illinois gun law broadly
prohibiting public carrying of handguns.192 There, the court favored a
broad interpretation of Heller and concluded that the right to armed
self-defense was not limited to within the home. 19 3  The State's
petition for rehearing was denied and the State did not seek further
review. 194 As discussed at length herein, the Ninth Circuit in Peruta
held that San Diego County's policy rejecting a general desire for self-
defense as "good cause" required to obtain a CCW license was
unconstitutional.
The "pro-state" circuits include the Second,195 Third,196 and
Fourth Circuits.197 The Second Circuit in Kachalsky upheld a CCW
requirement for particularized good cause under intermediate
scrutiny.198 The Third Circuit in Drake upheld a New Jersey CCW
law requiring "justifiable need" on the basis that the right to carry a
concealed weapon in public for self-defense fell outside the scope of
570, 634-35 (2008). Such an approach is inherently subjective and would further
the confusion signified by the current circuit court split.
190. To achieve this, the Supreme Court should continue to hear only Second
Amendment cases that resemble categorical bans or similarly severe restrictions.
See, e.g., McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010); Heller, 554 U.S. 570. In
both Heller and McDonald, the Court found a "near categorical ban" on possession
of handguns.
191. Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1173 (9th Cir. 2014).
192. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).
193. Id. at 935-36.
194. Moore v. Madigan, 708 F.3d 901, 902 (7th Cir. 2013).
195. Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2nd Cir. 2012).
196. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 429 (3rd Cir. 2013).
197. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013).
198. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 81, 96-97.
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the Second Amendment.199 The Drake court also noted that even if
such a right was within the scope of the Second Amendment,
intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard, and the standard was
satisfied. 200 Finally, the Fourth Circuit in Woollard upheld a State's
conditioning of permit issuance on proof of "good and substantial
reason" under intermediate scrutiny. 20 1
To date, the Supreme Court has consistently declined to grant
certiorari on a CCW case. 202 As a result, the issue remains unsettled.
It is important to note that Kachalsky predated Moore's creation of a
circuit conflict, however, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Woollard despite this existing conflict.203 Most recently, a writ of
certiorari was denied in Drake204 following additional briefing noting
that Peruta "deepens the circuit splits." 20 5
B. Applying "Tiered-Heller" to a Peruta-Like Case
This section applies-step by step-the proposed analysis in a
Peruta-like factual scenario. First, the court must determine if the
asserted right is protected Second Amendment conduct. Second, the
court should determine if the law amounts to a complete prohibition
on that protected conduct, as it found in Heller. If it does, the law is
struck down and the analysis ends here. If the challenged law reaches
the third level, the court determines the extent of the burden on the
protected conduct. The court then applies an appropriate level of
scrutiny corresponding to the severity of the burden. Like Heller,
199. Drake, 724 F.3d at 426, 429.
200. Id. at 430.
201. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876.
202. The Court has avoided CCW-related plaintiffs requests for review,
denying petitions for writ of certiorari in both Kachalsky and Woollard. Kachalsky,
701 F.3d 81, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013); Woollard, 712 F.3d 865, cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013).
203. See generally Kachalsky, 701 F.3d 81; Woollard, 712 F.3d 865; Moore v.
Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012); Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d
1144 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2014).
204. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3rd Cir. 2013), petition for cert. denied sub
nom., Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014).
205. Supplemental Brief for Petitioners at 1, Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d
Cir. 2013) (No. 13-827), 2014 WL 787210, at *1.
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each step should be considered within the historical context of the
Second Amendment, beginning with the founding era.
1. Scope of the Right
The Second Amendment analysis necessarily begins with a
threshold assessment as to whether the conduct or activity in question
is within the scope of the right to keep and bear arms. The only data
point for guidance on this assessment is Heller's command that the
scope of the right includes carrying a handgun in the home for lawful
self-defense. 206 As such, courts should rely on both the holding and
reasoning of Heller to determine whether the right extends to issues
like public CCW. Heller's reasoning dictates that a historical analysis
is required for cases of first impression.207 Thus, courts should look to
contemporaneous and post-ratification case law for assistance.
Additionally, courts conducting this assessment should adopt the
Ninth Circuit approach and disregard cases premised on the idea that
the Second Amendment does not confer an individual right.
2. Complete Prohibition
Once the court has assessed the scope of the right to bear arms, it
should determine whether the identified Second Amendment activity
is entirely or almost entirely prohibited. This methodology mirrors
Heller exactly. 208 Still further, like in Heller, the standard should be
applied practically so as not to elevate form over substance.209
Finding a categorical ban would invalidate the County's requirement
of particularized good cause. The Ninth Circuit's analysis ended at
this step because it found that the "good cause" policy requirement
amounted to a near-complete ban.
206. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
207. The part of the court's opinion that "explains the court's rationale ... is
part of the holding" and is not mere dicta. See United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d
649, 653 (7th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Ryan v. United States, 688
F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012).
208. See Heller, 554 U.S. 628-29 (2008).
209. See id. at 629 ("A statute which, under the pretence of regulating,
amounts to a destruction of the right, or which requires arms to be so borne as to
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3. Tiered Level of Scrutiny Relative to Severity ofBurden
The third step assigns a judicial standard according to how
severely a law burdens the right to keep and bear arms.2 10 This step is
seemingly implicit from Heller's dicta, and should be adopted by the
Court. 21' Although this final step is discussed as a new "step," as a
practical matter, Heller used this theory because the District of
Columbia's handgun restrictions were found to be the most severe
infringement possible-a complete ban.2 12 Therefore, the Court gave
the law the most severe treatment, by completely invalidating it as
unconstitutional.2 13
Where the restriction falls short of a complete ban, courts should
consider whether the restricted Second Amendment activity is part of
the "core right." Core rights should be presumptively subject to
heightened levels of scrutiny.2 14  The Government would have to
satisfy a very high standard when the core right of self-defense is
implicated.215 In contrast, a gun store owner using the Second
Amendment to further his commercial purpose would not be asserting
a recognized core right, thus there would be no presumption of
heightened scrutiny.
210. This section will use levels of scrutiny, means-end scrutiny, standard of
review, and judicial standard interchangeably. The proposed Tiered-Heller standard
is relevant primarily for the process to be used rather than the judicial standard
ultimately applied to Second Amendment cases. Accordingly, these standards are
not necessarily constrained to traditional means-end scrutiny such as strict scrutiny
or intermediate scrutiny (Second Amendment jurisprudence is minimally
constrained beyond the Court's Heller and McDonald decisions). The Court may
determine other standards are appropriate as part of the regressive hierarchical
scheme that ranges from complete prohibition to incidental burden. However, as a
practical matter the Court would and should be hesitant to stray from its
"traditionally expressed levels [of scrutiny]" for an "interest balancing" approach.
See Heller, 554 U.S. 634.
211. See id. at 634-35. By categorizing the District of Columbia's handgun
laws as a practical ban, the court assigned the ultimate heightened level of judicial
scrutiny-invalidation.
212. Id. at 628.
213. Id. at 635.
214. Id. at 634 ("We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose
core protection has been subjected to a freestanding 'interest-balancing' approach.").
215. Id. at 630 (requiring a handgun to be stored inoperable eliminates the
"core lawful purpose of self-defense").
2014] 141
32
California Western Law Review, Vol. 51 [2014], No. 1, Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol51/iss1/6
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
This Tiered-Heller approach may lack a concrete standard and
leave its application in doubt. Like many constitutional issues, this
approach is subject to criticism that it is overly subjective and wanting
of a meaningful test to apply. However, courts are familiar with
administering varying levels of scrutiny and in fact routinely do so. 2 16
Like other areas of constitutional law, the court need only match the
government restriction to a preexisting judicial standard. This is
similar to a preliminary determination of whether a right is
fundamental for the corresponding presumption of strict scrutiny.2 17
This framework is the superior standard used among the five circuits
to address the CCW issue.
VII. CONCLUSION
A may-issue CCW case is ideal for Supreme Court review and
clarification of Heller. However, it may be unlikely the state or local
governments will file a petition for certiorari to the same Court that
decided Heller and McDonald.218 Indeed, the State did not seek
further review (beyond a petition for rehearing) following a "pro-gun"
opinion in Moore. Despite various states' hesitancy, a nationwide
right to CCW in public may offend mainstream sensibilities and be
perceived as a favorable case for states to seek Supreme Court review.
In accordance with this proposed standard, the Court should continue
to hear only cases that appear to be categorical bans. Doing so leaves
unanswered, "middle of the road" cases that burden but do not ban
protected Second Amendment conduct. Importantly, the Court's
denial of certiorari in Peruta bears no weight on the proper analysis; it
simply leaves unanswered questions unanswered.2 19
216. In existing First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
recognized "courts must apply categories such as 'government speech,' 'public
forums,' 'limited public forums,' and 'nonpublic forums' with an eye toward their
purposes." Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 484 (2009) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
217. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973).
218. Interview with Peruta's Counsel Paul Neuharth, The Law Office of Paul
Neuharth, Jr. APC, in San Diego, Cal. (Feb. 18, 2014). The County has already
decided not to seek further review of the Ninth Circuit decision. See Gore, supra
note 126, at 1.
219. Until the Court addresses the Second Amendment again, lower courts
similarly should apply a heavy dose of Heller as the starting point for analysis.
142 [Vol. 51
33
Gonnella: Concealed Carry:  Can Heller's Handgun Leave the Home?
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2014
CAN HELLER'S HANDGUN LEAVE THE HOME?
The Heller dissent criticized the majority for leaving other Second
Amendment applications unanswered. 220 The CCW issue in Peruta is
just one example of an unanswered application of the Second
Amendment. The Heller majority justified its restraint by
acknowledging "there will be time enough to expound [its historical
analysis] . . . if and when those ['unanswered questions'] come before
us."2 2 1 The time has come for the Court to answer the CCW question
posed by Peruta and similar cases.222 And if the Court takes the
opportunity to review a CCW case, and is thereby required to apply a
given level of scrutiny,223 it should choose the tiered-Heller approach.
Gun law challenges implicating unsettled law require a complete
historical analysis to determine whether the restricted activity falls
within the scope of Second Amendment protection.224 The Ninth
Circuit rejected any proffered analyses lacking a foundation in
American history because they go "against the analysis of the Second
Amendment's scope employed in Heller and McDonald; those cases
made clear that the scope of the Second Amendment right depends not
on post-twentieth century developments, but instead on the
understanding of the right that predominated from the time of
ratification through the nineteenth century." 225
Adopting a Tiered-Heller standard allows the Court to defer the
decision on a level of scrutiny. The Court should first continue to
define the outer contours of the Second Amendment by deciding what
conduct is or is not within its scope. Next, the Court should determine
which restrictions on conduct within the scope of the right amount to a
ban and "total destruction of the right." This would require the Court
to fully develop self-defense related jurisprudence, including deciding
the CCW question, in the remaining "may-issue" states. This saves
220. Heller, 554 U.S. 720 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority
opinion is too ambiguous and leaves open the issue of which self-defense
confrontations and which weapons are protected by the Second Amendment).
221. Id. at 635.
222. In any event, it is unlikely the Court will be able to avoid the CCW
question for another two hundred years as it did with the individual right or militia
right question in Heller.
223. That is, if the Court determines an activity is protected by the Second
Amendment, and the restriction amounts to something less than a complete ban.
224. Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1173-75 (9th Cir. 2014).
225. Id. at 1174 n.21.
1432014]
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for a later day the implementation of the final step-addressing
restrictions or burdens that amount to something less than an absolute
prohibition on protected conduct (meaning within the scope) and then
applying an appropriate level of scrutiny.226
The various statutory exceptions could not save the San Diego
policy from classification as near complete prohibition on public self-
defense.227 Because the legislature has determined CCW is the
approved manner of carry in California, it should allow CCW for the
legal and constitutionally recognized purpose of self-defense. Like
Heller, the finding of a categorical ban ends the inquiry. The Court
should require recognition of self-defense as good cause, and bring an
end to discretionary licensing of a constitutional right.
Undoubtedly some think that the Second Amendment is outmoded
in a society where our standing army is the pride of our Nation,
where well-trained police forces provide personal security, and
where gun violence is a serious problem. That is perhaps debatable,
226. The level of protection for Second Amendment conduct other than self-
defense is undecided, such as for: commercial purposes (private security, gun
stores), sport, hunting, and collecting. See Heller, 554 U.S. 599. Despite the
Antifederalist fears of disarmament by the government, Americans during the
founding era thought the Second Amendment was "even more important for self-
defense and hunting." Id. Additionally, because historical analysis is required,
consideration of possession and training in contemplation of opposing government
tyranny may be viewed as a core right within the original understanding given the
historical backdrop of the founding era. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para.
2 (U.S. 1776).
227. Despite several CCW exceptions, such as for retired police officers and
hunters or anglers while in the field, the County's application of the state CCW
scheme has the practical effect of a ban for the majority of its citizens. Heller's
command that the Second Amendment is an individual right means the question is
not whether some people qualify to exercise the right under an exception, but rather,
"whether it allows the typical responsible, law-abiding citizen to bear arms in public
for the lawful purpose of self-defense." Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d
1144, 1169 (9th Cir. 2014).
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but what is not debatable is that it is not the role of this Court to
pronounce the Second Amendment extinct.228
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